

## Community resources

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*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 06MANAGUA8, LEADING LIBERAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AGREE ON

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#06MANAGUA8**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
<a href="#">06MANAGUA8</a>	<a href="#">2006-01-04 21:25</a>	<a href="#">2011-08-30 01:44</a>	<a href="#">CONFIDENTIAL</a>	<a href="#">Embassy Managua</a>

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758456.aspx>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758467.aspx>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758468.aspx>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-30/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2758464.aspx>  
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<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3966/la-ldquo-injerencia-rdquo-de-ee-uu-en-el-2006>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2758764.aspx>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-23/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2758753.aspx>  
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<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/4047/rodrigo-barreto-enviado-de-ldquo-vacaciones-rdquo>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotasSecundarias/Mundo2757239.aspx>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/NotaPrincipal/Mundo2746658.aspx>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2757244.aspx>  
<http://www.nacion.com/2011-05-16/Mundo/Relacionados/Mundo2746673.aspx>  
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3991/dra-yadira-centeno-desmiente-cable-diplomatico-eeuu>  
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3968/pellas-pronostico-a-eeuu-victoria-de-ortega-en-2006>  
<http://www.confidencial.com.ni/articulo/3967/barreto-era-ldquo-fuente-confiable-rdquo-para-eeuu>

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INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 000008

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/03/2016  
TAGS: [PGOV](#) [KDEM](#) [SOCI](#) [NU](#)  
SUBJECT: LEADING LIBERAL PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AGREE ON  
NEED TO UNITE, DEBATE ROLE OF PLC

REF: A. MANAGUA 3246  
[1](#)B. MANAGUA 3230  
[1](#)C. MANAGUA 3172

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: During a cordial breakfast meeting with the Ambassador, leading Liberal presidential candidates Eduardo Montealegre, Jose Antonio Alvarado and Jose Rizo agreed in principle that the Liberals must unite to confront the FSLN in the 2006 elections and wrest the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) from convicted ex-President Arnoldo Aleman's control. The candidates, however, disagreed on how to undermine Aleman's influence. Montealegre insisted that Aleman and his cronies will continue to dominate the party's leadership, while Alvarado and Rizo prefer to work with disaffected leaders to reform the party from the inside. The candidates agreed that the outcome of the March regional elections on the Atlantic Coast is uncertain, and the electoral authority has not done its job to ensure voter registration. Regarding the January 9 elections for the new Executive Board (Junta Directiva) for the National Assembly, the three were in accord that neither Enrique Quinonez nor Rene Nunez, two deputies sponsored by the PLC and FSLN respectively, should be elected president of the Junta. End Summary.

CANDIDATES AGREE ON NEED FOR UNITY, BUT NOT PLC STRATEGY

[1](#)2. (C) On January 3, the Ambassador, DCM and Polcouns met leading Liberal presidential candidates Eduardo Montealegre, Jose Antonio Alvarado and Jose Rizo for breakfast at the residence. The meeting was cordial and subdued, with less friction between Montealegre and Alvarado than Emboffs have observed in the past. The three agreed that Nicaragua's Liberals must forge an alliance to compete against the FSLN in the 2006 national elections and free the PLC from the damaging leadership of Arnoldo Aleman. However, the candidates still disagree fundamentally on strategy. Montealegre believes that Aleman will maintain control over the PLC leadership and may even cede the election to FSLN leader Daniel Ortega in exchange for an amnesty vote in the National Assembly. He stressed he could not agree to any arrangement that would appear like an accommodation with Aleman; to do so would risk losing 15 percentage points of public support. The only viable option, he claimed, is to make a clear break from Aleman and his followers and continue to "siphon off" decent PLC members.

[1](#)3. (C) Rizo, while agreeing that Aleman represents a liability for Liberalism, insisted that he would not have a

viable candidacy without the PLC and spoke of his long commitment to the party. Rizo emphasized the importance of the PLC,s machinery and said he is not willing to participate in an open primary competition separate from the PLC. He suggested bringing in an independent (external) polling firm to conduct a survey of Liberal supporters on the candidates, issues, etc.

14. (C) Alvarado acknowledged that the PLC must be taken from Aleman, but agreed with Rizo that the move must be done from the inside. He claimed that many party leaders are discontented with Aleman,s leadership and that the three candidates should put together a team to work on the details of an agreement to form an alliance acceptable to all.

15. (C) The Ambassador suggested bringing their respective teams together to start working on mechanisms and hammering out details. Alvarado was in favor, but Rizo and Montealegre were more cautious. Rizo indicated he is willing to talk, but did not commit completely, and Montealegre emphasized once again that he can not give the appearance of making a deal with Aleman's forces. The Ambassador impressed upon the candidates the urgency and importance of uniting the democratic forces as soon as possible. (Note: Following a meeting with the ALN-PC Executive Committee on January 3, Montealegre called the DCM to advise that they agreed in principle to participate in these discussions after the election of the new Junta Directiva in the National Assembly.

Montealegre asserted that if Aleman ends up in control of the Assembly leadership, however, "all bets may be off." End Note.)

#### ATLANTIC COAST OUTCOME UNCERTAIN

16. (C) The group held a brief discussion about the Atlantic Coast elections, in which all seemed to agree that the outcome is uncertain, turnout is likely to be low, and the CSE has not done its job to ensure the distribution of voter ID cards and voter registration. Montealegre also claimed that, contrary to press reports, Herty Lewites, rallies have enjoyed little draw.

#### CANDIDATES REJECT QUINONEZ AND NUNEZ TO LEAD ASSEMBLY

17. (C) Regarding the January 9 election of a new Junta Directiva for the National Assembly, the candidates all asserted that the presidency should not go to PLC-backed Enrique Quinonez or FSLN-supported Rene Nunez. Though the candidates did not indicate support for any specific deputy for the position, Rizo stated that "someone like" moderate PLC deputies Oscar Moncada or Alfonso Ortega Urbina could fill the role. (Note: The candidates' preferences are noteworthy because Montealegre controls six votes in the Assembly, four deputies are associated with Alvarado, and Rizo has the sympathy of several PLC deputies. Neither the PLC nor the FSLN can secure a majority for the elections without these votes. End Note.)

#### COMMENT: STILL JOCKEYING FOR POSITION

18. (C) The leading Liberal candidates agree that the democratic forces must form an alliance to defeat the FSLN and that Arnolando Aleman should not control this process, but their individual ambition still impedes an agreement. Alvarado and Rizo know they cannot defeat Montealegre in an open and fair competition without the support of the PLC machinery, so they continue to insist that the party can be reformed from within despite Aleman's enduring and, since his release from house arrest on medical parole, increasing domination of the leadership structure. Unfortunately, without a strong and united "Third Way" alternative, many of the disaffected PLC members that Montealegre hopes to woo may, fearful of their own political survival, continue to tolerate Aleman and resist defection.

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